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Erradicação da varíola e da pólio na Índia:
histórias comparativas e lições para políticas contemporâneas
Resumo  O artigo argumenta que um exame de-
talhado dos fatores que contribuíram para o de-
senvolvimento de estruturas e estratégias comple-
xas para a erradicação da varíola no Sul da Ásia
nos anos 70 pode fornecer indicações proveitosas
para a reformulação dos capítulos nacionais do
programa global de erradicação da pólio nesta re-
gião. Existe um impressionante arquivo nos es-
critórios da OMS em Genebra que detalha como
os ataques para a erradicação da varíola foram
localizados e então contidos em cidades, pequenas
vilas e áreas rurais remotas desta região, por equi-
pes de profissionais internacionais trabalhando
em conjunto com as autoridades locais. Uma ava-
liação sistemática dos esforços globais de erradi-
cação da varíola indicam paralelos entre os está-
gios iniciais do programa global de erradicação
da varíola e a atual situação da campanha contra
a pólio. Como veremos aqui, o artigo também
pode fornecer indicadores úteis para ações futuras
no Sul da Ásia e em outros locais.
Palavras-chave História da saúde global, Erra-
dicação da varíola, Erradicação da Poliomielite,
Saúde pública indiana, Vacinas
Abstract  This article argues that a detailed ex-
amination of factors contributing to the develop-
ment of complex structures and strategies for small-
pox eradication in South Asia in the 1970s can
provide fruitful indications for the reformulation
of the national chapters of the global polio eradi-
cation programme in this region. There is a mag-
nificent archive in the WHO’s Geneva offices,
which details how smallpox eradication outbreaks
were located and then contained in cities, small
towns and remote rural areas in this region, by
teams of international workers working closely
with local officials. A systematic assessment of the
global smallpox eradication efforts indicates par-
allels between the early stages of the global small-
pox eradication programme and the present situ-
ation of the polio campaign; as we will see here, it
can also provide useful indicators for future ac-
tion in South Asia and beyond.
Key words  Global health history, Smallpox erad-
ication, Polio eradication, Indian public health,
Vaccines
Sanjoy Bhattacharya 1
Rajib Dasgupta 2
4 3 4
B
h
at
ta
ch
ar
ya
 S
, D
as
gu
p
ta
 R
Introduction
Reports have quite recently noted the outbreak
of polio within Western Africa and Southern Asia.
Declarations by the World Health Organization
headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland (WHO) and
its South East Asia Regional Office in New Delhi,
India (WHO SEARO), about the future pros-
pects of eradicating polio across the globe, there-
fore, reveal more than a hint of anxiety. Yet, as
options and new strategies are weighed up by
members of the different United Nations organi-
zations, national aid agencies and global funding
bodies, one important set of lessons appear to
have been consistently ignored: those presented
by the successful eradication of smallpox, which
was formally ratified by the World Health As-
sembly in 1980. As in the 1970s, the South Asian
sub-continent – and, in particular, locations with-
in Northern and Eastern India – is providing
major hurdles for the successful completion of a
major global disease eradication programme.
The argument that smallpox and polio are
distinct diseases and, therefore, lessons cannot
be carried over from one eradication programme
to the other is both disingenuous and sterile. While
it is true that symptoms of infective polio and
smallpox cannot be more different – and, there-
fore, require distinct means of identification and
reporting – we need to remember that diseases
and the plans to eradicate them cannot be treat-
ed as entities purely defined by medical science.
Significant elements of both are deeply influenced
by a range of social and political conditions, as
people in different walks in life often perceive caus-
es of – and possible cures for – illness in widely
varied ways. Public health officials are, therefore,
forced to navigate complex administrative and
societal terrains, where knowledge gleaned from
scientific and medical journals – and the passage
of inflexible strictures passed by a handful of of-
ficials from distant centres of authority – can
only be partially useful; points worth remem-
bering even though global funding agencies in-
volved in blinkered quests for magic bullets con-
tinue to downplay or ignore these points. The
results of careful negotiations carried out with
local public health workers, political and com-
munity leaders, and members of the general pop-
ulations, which provide information crucial to
operational success, are of far greater use. From
this perspective, one can argue that immunisa-
tion campaigns of all types are deeply social and
political phenomena; a message public strategists
and funders can only ignore at their peril.
The global smallpox programme and India
The World Health Assembly (hereafter WHA)
started considering the prospect of eradicating
smallpox worldwide started as early in 1950 – dis-
cussions on the topic were held within the WHA
that year, as well as 1953, 1954 and 1958. Indeed,
Dr. Brock Chisholm, the WHO’s first Director
General, proposed global smallpox eradication in
1953, even if these discussions did not progress
particularly far. Noticeable progress on the issue
was witnessed at the 11th WHA, which was held at
Minneapolis, USA, in 1958, where Professor Vik-
tor Zdhanov, the USSR Deputy Minister of Health,
argued that the eradication of the variola virus
was both theoretically possible and important to
the world as a whole, including countries that had
managed to expunge the disease within their ter-
ritories. His views – and the proposal put for-
ward by him in the shape of what is often referred
to as the so-called “Zdhanov resolution” – received
broad-based support at the gathering, leading the
WHO’s Executive Board to meet immediately af-
ter the WHA and announce preparations for a
future smallpox eradication drive. In Geneva, this
took the shape of the acceptance of donations of
freeze dried smallpox vaccine from the USSR and
glycerolated vaccine from Cuba, which was used
to create an “account” that would distribute stocks
to countries where eradication campaigns were
initiated; the decision also resulted in discussions
with officials based in the WHO regional offices
and national governments in charge of smallpox
endemic territories1.
Officials based in India, a major reservoir of
smallpox cases, were brought into discussions
soon after the passage of the 1958 resolution.
These negotiations, which involved senior mem-
bers of the WHO, WHO SEARO and Indian fed-
eral government, did not go smoothly in a situa-
tion where there was disagreement even about
the most basic issues, like the exact definition of
smallpox eradication. It also did not help mat-
ters that WHO officials based in Geneva attempt-
ed to impose a fixed set of ideas and policies on
people based in New Delhi, including people serv-
ing in WHO SEARO. Interestingly, the problems
continued even after the WHO officials based at
different locations agreed upon specific policies –
the fact that these strategies were offered to the
Indian authorities as an inflexible blueprint, with-
out any substantive offer of financial support
for making their implementation possible, did
not go down well in the corridors of power. In-
deed, this situation ensured that calls for small-
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pox eradication emanating from Geneva in the
late 1950s and early 1960s received a rather frosty
reception across the Indian political spectrum2.
The tide of Indian disinterest began to slowly
turn only in the mid-1960s, after the WHO de-
partments charged with starting planning work
on smallpox eradication re-organised themselves.
Interestingly, this involved employing people who
were more willing than their predecessors to en-
gage with Indian politicians and public health of-
ficials, in order to develop common ground be-
fore an organised push to eradicate variola was
launched3. An increased budget, which allowed
the relevant WHO departments to fund agreed
plans and share some costs with the Indian health
departments in Delhi and the states, helped mat-
ters along. The results were impressive at one sig-
nificant level. The Indian federal authorities agreed
to organise district-level pilot projects within each
state, based, at least on paper, the commitment of
comprehensive numbers of local health staff. This
was considered helpful within the WHO, as it held
out the promise of allowing for the collection of
information that would reveal if the smallpox
eradication plan was workable4.
At another level, though, insurmountable
problems began to make an almost immediate
appearance, despite the announcement of re-
forms by the Indian authorities at frequent in-
tervals. The preliminary Indian national small-
pox eradication programme, which was planned
in association with WHO representatives, was,
therefore, fragmented and weak even as late as
1965. Several factors ensured this. The “liquid”
smallpox vaccine was unreliable and the freeze
dried variety was short in supply; international
donors like the Unicef appeared to have relatively
little inkling of the infrastructural situation in the
country and provided items like electric refriger-
ators for vaccine storage in areas that had inter-
mittent or no electricity; several state and district
level administrators remained hostile to the erad-
ication goal, there were wide variations in the ca-
pabilities of vaccinating and supervisory staff
across states and their districts, and lack of ideo-
logical unity within the WHO offices and Indian
government departments resulted in operation-
al confusion in the field. It did not help at this
stage that the WHO was unable to commit field
workers to the pilot projects; instead, organiza-
tional field representatives appeared to quickly
move in and out of districts, without developing
any substantive links with local health workers.
So, to the great frustration of several officials
based in Geneva, most pilot projects started late,
overshot agreed timetables and, often, came up
with defective data5.
All these experiences quickly taught senior
WHO representatives that it was far easier to draw
up collaborative plans in the sub-continent than
to arrange for their implementation. The experi-
ence also brought home, by the mid-1960s, the
important fact, that they could not hope to mi-
cro-manage the programme, top-down, from a
great distance. As a consequence of the problems
faced in the vast majority of Indian states, splits
began to appear within the WHO firmament – it
was reported that senior WHO SEARO officials,
including the Regional Director, were openly ex-
pressing doubts about the possibility of ever erad-
icating smallpox. This, in turn, emboldened crit-
ics of the proposed programme within Indian
federal and state governments, including mem-
bers of the office of the Indian Director General
of Health Services, to criticise the plan to expunge
variola. The problem deteriorated to such an ex-
tent by 1967, that people within the WHO’s Small-
pox Eradication Unit feared that the Indian gov-
ernment would cut back its support very sub-
stantially – and potentially even withdraw – from
the programme6. The situation was finally res-
cued by a series of time-consuming and placato-
ry diplomatic initiatives managed by the Unit’s
Chief, Donald A. Henderson, who travelled to
India for negotiations with several senior gov-
ernment officials, including those based in the
prime minister’s office. These efforts bore fruit
and a new deal was struck, where the Indian fed-
eral authorities agreed to continue to be support-
ive of global smallpox eradication – they agreed
to streamline the health services department, cre-
ate a more dynamic smallpox unit within it and
also commit greater resources to state-level small-
pox eradication efforts from 1968 onwards7.
However, the WHO’s success in these negotia-
tions came at a price. The organisation was forced
to commit greater levels of financial assistance and
personnel to the sub-continental campaigns, and
promise a re-organisation of activities within
WHO SEARO8. All these developments, which
began to have a measurable impact on field activ-
ities from 1970 onwards, were important in the
long run; these readjustments set into place a struc-
ture that was to gradually produce an adminis-
trative environment conducive to the successful
eradication of smallpox. Particularly significant
was an arrangement where the WHO’s Smallpox
Eradication Units in Geneva and New Delhi began
to work in close association with a similar body
set by the Indian government; Nicole Grasset, a
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remarkable French official, was charged with co-
ordinating the work from the Indian capital. Of-
ficials attached to all three bodies met on a regular
basis, collected information from the states and
their districts, developed policies together, and set
up mixed teams of international and Indian work-
ers; these teams were given the responsibility of
going into the states, searching for smallpox cas-
es, and putting containment and vaccination
schemes into place. Henderson and Grasset ex-
pected these workers to spend significant amounts
of their time in India in the field9.
Interestingly, most international and Indian
workers were supportive of this arrangement, even
though this adversely affected the health of many.
Those unwilling or unable to put with the rigours
of the posting were quietly moved on; to other
government departments if they were Indian and
out of the country if they drawn from abroad.
The policy was quite ruthlessly enforced, so that
the Indian smallpox eradication programme was,
between 1971 and 1975, in the hands of a small
core of well organised workers, who respected each
others’ abilities and were encouraged to adapt
policies to the numerous social, political and eco-
nomic conditions encountered in the field. In this
regard, mobile teams were encouraged to draw
upon the help of staff drawn from local commu-
nities and, crucially, given access to the financial
means to offer generous short-term employment
contracts. The information provided by this di-
verse group of workers, who were accorded the
role of valued partners in the management local
campaigns, proved crucial to the development of
socially and politically acceptable – and, thus, ef-
fective – policies (most notably so in major states
such as Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh and Bengal)10.
These developments were significant contrib-
utors to the implementation of surveillance, con-
tainment and vaccination work, without a gen-
eral recourse to brute force. J.R.D. Tata, the Chair-
man of Tata Industries proved to be an invalu-
able ally during the Bihar smallpox epidemic in
1974, both at a local and a federal level; his per-
sonal rapport with Indira Gandhi, India’s pow-
erful prime minister, proved invaluable to the
WHO’s smallpox eradication units in Geneva and
New Delhi11. It is important to note that com-
pulsion was usually deployed with the support
of federally controlled police and military forces,
usually after discussions with local parliamenta-
ry representatives had been carried out (striking-
ly, a phase extra-constitutional rule introduced
by the “Emergency” of 1975-77 reduced the com-
plexity of local negotiations, but did not cause
their discontinuation)12. Despite the existence of
some variations in the effectiveness of the mobile
teams of epidemiologists, health workers and local
community workers, it is important to recognise
that this strategy created for the first time an in-
ternational workforce that was allowed to work
relatively freely in the country, once government
clearances for the officials had been received. Some
regions, like politically sensitive frontier regions
bordering China and Pakistan, remained off lim-
its to workers of some nationalities and could
only be accessed by teams of Indian workers13.
For a variety of reasons, making all these new
arrangements was not an easy process, by any
means. WHO SEARO retained a great degree of
autonomy and its Director continued to harbour
serious doubts about the smallpox eradication
programme. Yet, over time, Henderson and his
supporters within the WHO – an agency that was
not united on the issue either, especially as signif-
icant elements of the Indian campaigns continued
to struggle in the early 1970s – were able to counter
this opposition through a variety of measures. At
one level, this team was able to negotiate the cre-
ation of a special fund, with significant Swedish
assistance, which the WHO’s smallpox eradica-
tion units were able to draw upon, without time-
consuming clearances from the WHO SEARO
Director and the Indian government. At another,
people like Henderson, Grasset and Larry Bril-
liant kept working hard to develop good working
relations with parliamentary representatives, other
politicians and their financial backers, based at all
levels of government and society. Some of these
connections proved invaluable at crucial junctures
of the programme – the significant economic,
material and political support provided by J.R.D.
Tata during the epidemic outbreaks of 1974 in
Bihar is perhaps the best example of such trends.
And at yet another level, efforts were consistently
maintained to keep all major foreign donors
abreast of the true epidemiological situation and
administrative problems in South Asia; this oper-
ational transparency was crucial to winning the
trust of senior officials working within organisa-
tions like the Swedish International Development
Agency, USAID and Soviet Academy of Medical
Sciences, who, in turn, would come up with sorely
needed assistance at crucial junctures12,14.
Seen from this perspective, the question of
eradicating smallpox in India was never purely a
medical or biological issue, and never presented
simplistically as such by those responsible for its
eradication. It was, by necessity, a far more intri-
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cate phenomenon, which required careful prepa-
ration and implementation. In this regard, tack-
ling all manner of administrative, political, social
and economic complexities was as important as
getting the vaccine technologies and the operating
methods right. Put another way, the widespread
adoption of freeze-dried vaccine and the bifurcat-
ed needle was important. But so was the adop-
tion of several other decisions – namely, the de-
velopment of containment and immunisation
policies that were sensitively adapted to local con-
ditions and infrastructural conditions with the
help of community partnership programmes, as
well as the consistent efforts to ensure that these
campaigns were managed by workers who were
spending significant time in the field. Indeed, in-
ternational workers often played the important
role of accessing information from South Asian
health workers of all ranks, which were then used
to good effect; touring epidemiologists employed
by the WHO were also frequently able to ensure
that the views of junior and mid-level Indian and
Bangladeshi health officials were not rejected out-
right by state- and federal-level representatives in
the sub-continent. This point is often made by
international workers who recognise that they were
receiving ideas from national and local workers,
which were then made the basis of important,
region-specific policy adaptations15. The follow-
ing section considers whether the adoption of such
strategies might be useful to the contemporary
Indian polio eradication programme.
The Indian polio eradication programme:
contours, problems and futures
A 1983 meeting of public health experts in Bella-
gio considered, for the first time, the idea of polio
eradication as a component of the Expanded Pro-
gramme on Immunisation (EPI)16. The follow-
ing year, Rotary International constituted a con-
sultative committee to consider the potential of
this goal; the result was a declaration that efforts
would be made to eradicate polio by 2005. This
was followed by the 1985 Pan American Health
Organisation (PAHO) resolution to eradicate
polio from the Western hemisphere by 1990 –
166 member countries adopted, in 1988, the goal
of global polio eradication by 2000 at the WHA.
The initiative was projected as an “appropriate
gift, together with the eradication of smallpox,
from the twentieth to the twenty-first century”17.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI)
was, thus, born.
Yet, the unanimity characterising the WHA
1988 resolution about the meaning of – and the
strategies required for – polio eradication turned
out to be inconstant. At this assembly, eradica-
tion had been defined as the complete absence of
the disease following concerted public health in-
terventions; however, discussions and declara-
tions from within and outside the confines of the
WHO subsequently displayed a far less clear cut
approach to the issue18. The Global Commis-
sion for the Certification of the Eradication of
Poliomyelitis has, of course, defined the term
“eradication” as the absence of circulation of all
indigenous wild polioviruses for at least a three
year period during which surveillance activities
had been maintained19. Alternative assessments
about the form and possibilities of polio eradi-
cation have persisted side by side since the launch
of the GPEI; a variety of constituencies and view-
points appear to have been responsible for these
definitional and attitudinal complexities18. Some
suggested that the disease could be eliminated
through regularised immunisation programmes,
based on careful surveillance and systematic
OPV-based immunisation of infants; ideas that
continue to be advocated tenaciously by those
arguing for a changed approach towards the glo-
bal fight against polio20.
In India, OPV-based work was included in
the EPI in 1978-79, which was subsequently up-
graded to a Universal Immunisation Programme
(UIP) in 1985. The “Polio Plus” programme was
initiated in Tamil Nadu state in 1986 with a grant
of US$2.6 million from Rotary International; this
was followed by another US$20 million grant
from the same source, for financing the procure-
ment of OPV, cold chain support, surveillance
activities and social mobilisation across the coun-
try. A staged approach to eradicate polio followed
in eleven other states, and the stated aim was to
extend the programme to other parts of the coun-
try after that21. The expanded project took the
shape of the so-called “Pulse Polio” initiative
(PPI), which was initiated in the Tamil Nadu,
Kerala and Delhi states during 1994. Also referred
to as the “Supplementary Immunisation Activi-
ties”, the strategy involved the mass immunisa-
tion of a target population of children up to five
years of age, on pre-arranged immunisation days
irrespective of their earlier vaccinal status. A coun-
try-wide pulse polio programme was put into
place from July 1995, after the state governments
responded to concerted federal calls for its exten-
sion across the board. Unfortunately, the dead-
lines proposed at that time, of eradication by 2000
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and certification by 2005, have joined the list of
missed opportunities in the history of public
health in India22.
What were the factors responsible for the
missing of these targets in India, which appeared
in 1995 to have broad-based political and scien-
tific support locally? Most significantly, perhaps,
the main tenet of eradication – the strengthening
of ongoing routine immunisation programmes
(RI) – was never followed. Instead, RI coverage
appears to have been weakened following the in-
troduction of the PPI strategy, which has been
noted by the country’s Planning Commission;
this influential federal body has recorded these
adverse trends in its Tenth Five Year Plan docu-
ment, after drawing upon data gathered under
the aegis of the National Family Health Survey
(NFHS)23. The Table 1, based on NFHS data,
shows that Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Hi-
machal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharash-
tra and Tamil Nadu states have all registered a
decline in the proportion of fully immunised chil-
dren (12-23 months) and also for OPV-based
work, which require three doses of immunisa-
tion (for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to
these as OPV 1-3).
This pessimism has been confirmed by other
analysts. The District Level Household Survey
(DLHS), for instance, has reported a decline, na-
tionally, in the proportion of fully immunised
children; from 54% in 1998-99 to 48% in 2002-04
(large variations have, of course, also been re-
ported in RI coverage across Indian states – from
97% in Kerala to 21% in Bihar)24. Commenta-
tors have blamed the significance accorded to PPI
for official and civilian “fatigue”, which, it is
claimed, has created vast pools of un-immunized
children25.
Alternative arguments are also visible, of
course. The improvements in RI coverage in the
states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have been
showcased by GPEI programme officers, who
have been known to claim that these trends are
representative of a major turnaround of public
health conditions in these regions. However, the
figures from these two states need to be scruti-
nised closely, which can be done, for instance, by
using the NFHS data reproduced in the Table 2.
What is significantly different in these two
states – in comparison to the rest of India – is the
divergence between the coverage rates of OPV
versus the Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus (DPT)
vaccines. As these sets of vaccines are adminis-
tered simultaneously, one expects to see a close
correlation between these two figures; yet, this is
not the case in Bihar (82.4% for OPV versus
Table 1. Comparisons between OPV and general immunisation in selected states in India.
India
Andhra Pradesh
Delhi
Gujarat
Himachal Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Maharashtra
Tamil Nadu
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
National Family
Health Survey  1
43.5
53.6
45.4
68.2
57.8
75.6
50.0
63.6
63.5
78.4
52.2
71.4
77.4
74.2
64.3
81.8
65.1
86.0
National Family
Health Survey  2
42.0
62.8
58.7
81.6
69.8
81.0
53.0
68.6
83.4
89.6
60.6
78.3
79.0
88.1
78.4
90.8
88.8
98.0
National Family
Health Survey  3
35.5
78.2
46.0
79.2
63.2
79.1
45.0
65.3
74.2
88.6
55.0
73.8
75.3
83.1
58.8
73.4
80.8
87.8
Source: www.nfhs3.org; National Family Health Survey 3 Fact Sheets.
Note: OPV 1-3 – Three waves of OPV-based immunisation work.
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46.1% for DPT) and Uttar Pradesh (87.5% for
OPV versus 30% for DPT). When viewed in com-
parative perspective, these figures look even less
impressive26.
Another important consideration in an erad-
ication programme is the reliable monitoring of
the vaccinal status of the target population and
the reporting of disease. In India, the assessment
of immunisation coverage amongst children has
relied largely on the oral testimony provided by
parents; recent evidence from Turkey has ques-
tioned this method27. Presentations based on these
sources of information at the seventeenth meet-
ing of the India Expert Advisory Group (IEAG),
which was held in May 2007, indicated that there
were 473 cases of wild polio virus (WPV). Of
these, 85% had received more than three doses of
OPV and nearly one-third received ten doses or
more. By contrast, 99% of 6749 non-polio cases
of Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) received more
than three doses and 805 cases received more than
ten doses28.
It is worth noting that in Western Uttar
Pradesh, over two-thirds of cases continue to
occur below the age of 24 months; the median
age of incidence is in the range of 12-18 months29.
The official position is that more than 90% of the
children under 5 received e”10 doses in Uttar
Pradesh. What is significant – and of some epi-
demiological concern – is that, according to par-
ents’ reports, about 10% of children below one
year and about two-thirds of the children younger
than two years reached the level of e”10 doses.
This is significant in a situation where influential
gatherings like the seventeenth IEAG have con-
tinued to note with concern that WPV persists as
a disease of very young children; recommenda-
tions that the younger age groups be immunized,
over a shorter period of time, thus continues to
be widely urged30.
A recent study carried out in two endemic dis-
tricts in Uttar Pradesh – Moradabad and J. P.
Nagar – found district level programme manag-
ers and medical officers complaining of lack of
flexibility in local level decision making. They re-
ported that field workers were working under great
pressure and that outbreaks of WPV had brought
on the threat or imposition of penalties from the
top, all of which was leading to demoralization
and discontent amongst personnel operating in
the localities31. These trends appear to exist else-
where as well, particularly in Western Uttar Pradesh
and some districts of Bihar; these regions have
emerged as pockets of endemic polio. Disease en-
demicity in these “hotspots” has been variously
attributed to biological determinants like the “pe-
culiar environmental and socio-demographic
milieu of Western UP (high population density,
high birth rate, poor sanitation, etc.) coupled with
poor SIA performance with consequent low cov-
erage”, as well as to programmatic and social de-
terminants like the “falsification of data and fierce
resistance by the minority community”30.
Investigations also reveal that outpatient ser-
vices provided by primary healthcare centres
(PHC) and work carried out by other public
health programmes have been disrupted by po-
lio-related activities. For this reason, “why only
polio?” is a question frequently posed by junior
officials and civilians32. Problems consequently
caused for GPEI workers have led to wide-rang-
ing initiatives of doubtful long-term viability, like
cases where local level political and civilian lead-
ers distributing cash in order to improve accep-
tance of the vaccine. More worryingly, there ap-
pear to have been cases where polio vaccination
was carried out forcibly by health administra-
tors, with support received from local police forc-
es; apart from creating hostility within affected
communities, it has caused nervousness about
Table 2. Comparisons between OPV, DPT and general immunisation in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
Bihar
Uttar Pradesh
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% DPT1-3 coverage
% fully immunised
% OPV1-3 coverage
% DPT1-3 coverage
National Family
Health Survey  1
-
-
-
-
-
-
National Family
Health Survey  2
11.6
42.2
24.9
20.2
41.3
32.7
National Family
Health Survey  3
32.8
82.4
46.1
22.9
87.5
30
Source: www.nfhs3.org; National Family Health Survey 3 Fact Sheets.
Note: DPT – Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus Vaccine; OPV – Oral Polio Vaccine.
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the aims of the GPEI within territories where the
news of the use of compulsion has spread. This,
perhaps, explains the continued existence of sus-
picion and resistance towards GPEI programmes
in certain pockets, most notably amongst sec-
tions of different Muslim communities, as well
as economically and socially disadvantaged Hin-
du communities like the Dalits. A recent decision
to administer a single dose of OPV to all Haj
pilgrims above sixteen years and infants below
two years has not helped clarify matters in rela-
tion to the GPEI. In a situation where there is no
evidence to suggest that adults act predominant-
ly as carriers or that a single dose offers sufficient
immunity, Muslim individuals affected by the
policy – and their political and social representa-
tives – have been wondering why the GPEI work-
ers only target children. The many facets of “Mus-
lim” resistance have been widely reported by the
media over a period of time33.
It must be noted here that the nature of op-
position to GPEI work is highly complex and can-
not simply be explained by religious affiliation –
particularly to the Islamic faith – alone. Local
development issues are increasingly becoming
bargaining points been state representatives and
community groups, and resistance to PPI is of-
ten visible in areas where civilian demands for
roads, bridges or public food distribution sys-
tems have not been met. The local media – writ-
ing in Hindi and Urdu – has contributed to the
dissemination of news and exaggerated reports
of WPV and vaccinal side-effects, which have
stoked uncontrolled rumours and parental ner-
vousness about OPV. This is at least partially at-
tributable to the GPEI management’s inability to
develop a consistent policy for engagement with
the media; although Unicef ’s presentation at the
seventeenth IEAG claimed that there has been a
significant reduction in the hostility of local me-
dia, a lot remains to be achieved32. Interestingly,
interviews conducted recently by Rajib Dasgupta
amongst village headmen and PHC medical of-
ficers in the East Khasi and Ri Bhoi districts of
Meghalaya state in North-Eastern India, indicates
the presence of a similar complex interplay be-
tween rumours about GPEI work and resistance
to OPV-based immunisation; worryingly, these
trends appear to have fuelled partially by the
Christian clergy and local media, which have
raised numerous objections to components of
the anti-polio campaign in that region34.
Several solutions have been put forth as the
best means of tackling the complex challenges
being faced by GPEI officials in the field, in India
and elsewhere. A study prepared by Grassly et
al.35 claimed that the polio 2006 outbreak indi-
cated “stark evidence of the need for high cover-
age with multiple doses of vaccine as early as
possible in life in these areas” and suggested “sus-
tained dialogue with local communities and
strong political commitment”35. But, communi-
ty dialogue and participation has been interpret-
ed in relatively indifferent ways by GPEI’s man-
agers. Rather than working on a concerted basis
with PHC workers of all grades, they have inde-
pendently developed and deployed numerous
“social mobilisation strategies”; in the high risk
areas of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, this has taken
the shape of a communication platform and net-
work called SMNet, which was created by Unicef
in 2001. It is noteworthy that GPEI-sponsored
“social mobilisation” work draws substantially
on ideas that focus on the application of market-
ing principles to social services, wherein strate-
gies are developed for the creation of demand for
a specific product and its acceptance amongst
targeted communities. These ideas can, in turn,
be linked to the development of schemes of selec-
tive primary health care (SPHC), which emerged
as a result of a consensus in some circles that the
PHC approach advocated in Alma Ata was far
too broad and unachievable. The architects of
SPHC, therefore, recommended that political
leaderships be presented with specific attainable
goals such as disease eradication, which could
then be developed alongside other healthcare
measures in consultation with a large number of
stakeholders36,37.
In practice, however, the inflexible verticality
of the GPEI has left relatively little space for com-
munity involvement in strategic planning and
policy deployment. Although it cannot be denied
that the social mobilization is a great improve-
ment over the passive transmission of health ed-
ucation messages by the Indian federal and state
authorities through mass media, the project is
based largely on a top-down approach that does
not adequately address the plethora of local so-
cial, political and economic conditions encoun-
tered across the country. The GPEI’s biggest weak-
ness lies therein, especially in relation to the local-
ities of India. Commentators have, therefore, been
urging that GPEI-related social mobilization pro-
grammes address the specificities of local health
service systems and communities while advocat-
ing new policies. They have also pointed out that
community dialogue be combined with existing
social mobilization strategies. Indeed, analysts
keep recommending the identification of key per-
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sons or groups at different levels of the civilian
administration and the community; they also
urge that differential needs of a community, based
on age, gender, class, caste, religion and educa-
tion be considered. All these reforms, when in-
troduced, would, it has been argued, help in-
crease vaccinal coverage and ensure greater levels
of support for GPEI work. Interestingly, similar
sentiments have also been echoed by the WHA in
2007 (held over 14-23 May), which urged all coun-
tries with endemic polio to establish mechanisms
that would enhance political commitment and
civilian participation in poliomyelitis eradication
activities at all levels38. It is incumbent on the GPEI
managers, in India and elsewhere, to respond
positively to this call for operational openness;
the future continuation of systematic polio im-
munisation appears to depend on it.
Concluding comments
Describing two global eradication programmes,
as they have unfolded in complex forms in India,
this article seeks to highlight issues that we con-
sider worthy of consideration by policy design-
ers and managers involved in work carried out in
the Indian sub-continent. Comparisons are made
in the hope that the smallpox story can provide
useful leads to the managers of the polio cam-
paign, as it struggles to cope with fresh disease
outbreaks, social opposition to reporting and
vaccination, and not least operational disunities
in the field. Although the biological nature of the
diseases targeted by the two programmes are
quite distinct, this article has tried to show that
there is much more else to consider in the design-
ing and the implementation of a global eradica-
tion effort. Lessons provided by the anti-small-
pox campaign about the best ways to counter
social, political, economic and technological chal-
lenges can be invaluable to GPEI managers and
workers currently active in the sub-continent.
Importantly, these messages are pertinent for
officials located at all levels of national and local
government, WHO and Unicef administration,
and, not least, agencies providing funding for
mass immunisation campaigns in the remaining
polio endemic countries.
There has been a tendency amongst senior
GPEI officials to formulate relatively inflexible
prescriptions from a distance and efforts to im-
pose these on local health workers by decree. These
trends are attended by a general unwillingness to
organise the systematic collection of information
from within local communities, to use the result-
ant insights to adapt campaigns to local condi-
tions and, indeed, to develop meaningful schemes
of community partnership, where members of
the target population are employed to work on
polio reporting and vaccination. The experience
of smallpox eradication in India – and in partic-
ular in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar – shows that
such operational inflexibility can lead to a situa-
tion where polio remains endemic in the sub-
continent; a worrying prospect for the goal of
global polio eradication.
There is another global disease eradication
programme whose history offers worrying in-
sights into the long-term damage wreaked by the
failure of a well-funded campaign – the unsuc-
cessful effort to rid the world of malaria. Consis-
tently dogged by technical difficulties after the
problems faced with the use of DDT, this pro-
gramme was also hamstrung by deep-seated ad-
ministrative problems; these resulted mainly from
the inflexible attitudes of a relatively small team of
people in Geneva and New York, who appeared to
believe that they could ensure the development of
a unitary strategy that could then be implement-
ed worldwide. The plan proved disastrous, as fed-
eral and local governments within sovereign na-
tions reacted badly to the dictates from distant
locations, and frequently refused to co-operate
with WHO teams at crucial junctures. The disin-
tegration of the malaria eradication programme
resulted and hampered, for many years after-
wards, efforts to resuscitate smaller regional ma-
laria control programmes and the mobilisation
of broad-based support for the global smallpox
eradication programme. Well informed commen-
tators had, of course, warned us about the pitfalls
of ignoring the lessons provided by the doomed
malaria programme and the successful smallpox
campaign some years ago39. Unfortunately, such
warnings appear to have been ignored by most of
those in charge of running the GPEI, as we now
know, to the great detriment of the programme.
One can only hope that the global polio erad-
ication programme does not fail, even though
some well-informed commentators have raised
serious doubts about the possibility of success.
To make polio eradication likelier, it is clear that
the great challenges facing the national chapters
of the GPEI, in India and elsewhere, will have to
be tackled with greater sensitivity and care40. If
the lessons of the final phases of the smallpox
programme are taken on board, there can be lit-
tle doubt that careful preparation, operational
flexibility and the deployment of international
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Collaborations
S Bhattacharya conceptualized this paper, after
which R Dasgupta and he spent equal effort in
putting the piece together.
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staff willing to spend long stints in the field and
work in close association with health personnel
is of great importance. In India specifically, broad-
based from the political and administrative es-
tablishment, in New Delhi and state governments
and legislatures, would help increase the morale
of local vaccinators and supervisors. Such a situ-
ation would also make it easier for international
workers to engage in GPEI work in the troubled
districts and sub-divisions; importantly, so would
greater levels of unanimity within the various
WHO and Unicef offices. Such reforms, when
introduced, would have long term benefits, even
if polio was never eradicated, and the long term
goal was converted to one of eliminating and
controlling the spread of the disease. Indeed, op-
erational clarity and flexibility in the field would
help in the development and running of a regu-
larised polio vaccination programme, as well as
a host of immunisation projects, which would
help the long term survival of a meaningful glo-
bal and national EPI projects; this, in turn, would
help reduce childhood mortality and also increase
the quality of children’s lives worldwide20.
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